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A commentary on
Commentary: Utility-free heuristic models of two-option choice can mimic predictions of
utility-stage models under many conditions
by Padoa-Schioppa C. (2015). Front. Neurosci. 9:188. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2015.00188
In his accompanying commentary on our recent paper, Dr. Padoa-Schioppa identifies two putative
errors in our manuscript (Piantadosi and Hayden, 2015). Both reflect basic misunderstandings of
our arguments, as well as those of Tversky (1969), whose work ours is an extension of.
First, he argues that some commodities are inherently incommensurate, such as different juice
flavors (“there is no parametric dimension along which two flavors can be assigned a scalar value”).
This argument seems appealing because it is difficult to think of a single algorithmic function that
would describe a juice flavor as a single number. So in a colloquial sense, juices could indeed by
called incommensurate.
However, most models of choice assume, either tacitly or explicitly, that there is an intermediate
stage during which each dimension is represented in a scalar manner and may there be deformed.
A famous example is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In PT, gains are transformed
using a convex utility curve and probability is deformed by a different curve; these transformed
scalars are then combined into a single utility variable (Figure 1A). The same concept can be
extended to thinking about very abstract goods like juice flavor, the funniness of a joke, or the
intellectual appeal of a novel theory (Figure 1B). To do so, onemay use a lookup table, as illustrated
in our example. One example of a model that involves such a lookup table is Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad (2006). In that paper, the authors propose that juices can be given a scalar value parameter,
and that this parameter can be experimentally observed through preferences.
These idea of an intermediate stage is a critical part of several famous economic models
(Bernoulli, 1738; Tversky, 1969; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), including Padoa-Schioppa’s own
work, and has a direct neural correlate in the orbitofrontal cortex (Blanchard et al., 2015). A
different possibility would be that it is impossible to construct an intermediate-stage model for a
given choice process (Figure 1C). In such cases our ideas do not apply, nor would Tversky’s. Some
models that do not have an intermediate stage include decision by sampling, elimination by aspects,
and query theory, as well as other sampling-based heuristic approaches (Tversky, 1972; Stewart
et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2007; Hayden and Platt, 2009).
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of simplified process models for choice. (A) In
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), reward amount and
probability are both transformed into a single scale, but the two scales are
different dimensions. These are the combined into a single utility scale.
(Some aspects of PT are ignored here). (B) Choices between dissimilar
goods that differ in complex ways can be solved in an analogous manner.
The abstract dimensions (here, juice flavor) can be transformed using a
lookup table (illustrated here) or some other method, before combining into a
single utility scale. (C) A truly incommensurate good is combined to create a
utility signal without an intermediate stage.
Second, Dr. Padoa-Schioppa is concerned that there are
well-defined value comparisons to which our methods do not
apply. We clearly acknowledged this point in our original
manuscript. Our formalization provides a way to recognize
utility functions it does apply to; this is a strength of our
approach.
However, while the example he gives was not discussed
in our manuscript, it is straightforwardly covered using the
approach we advocate. Indeed, the set of contexts to which
our arguments apply is somewhat larger than we stated in
the original article. Specifically, it applies to any context in
which the choice can be modeled by a utility equation and
then that equation can be rearranged to avoid the utility
stage.
Dr. Padoa-Schioppa discusses a choice between gambles with
probability (P1) of reward (R1) and fixed costs (C1), where choice
is determined by:
P1 · R1 − C1 > P2 · R2 − C2.
Following a method much like the one we presented (that is, first
computing relative differences and then rearranging the terms),
this choice is equivalent to:
p
P +
r
R
c
C
>
C
P · R
where the uppercase letters are the average value in each
dimension and the lowercase are half the difference.
To translate into prose, the decision-maker does the
essentially same thing as in the examples used in our paper:
she computes a normalization term that depends on average
values, and then computes the ratio of the dimension-free relative
differences for gains, and asks whether that ratio is greater or less
than the relative difference for costs.
Thus, this example thus does not challenge our arguments, but
instead enhances them. Moreover, it endorses our bigger (and
ultimately very simple) point: given the power and flexibility of
algebra, it is often possible to create process models that have
no utility stage but make identical predictions to ones that do
through a simple rearrangement of terms.
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